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In the event of a pandemic that poses widespread infection and high death rates, the utilitarian
mandate to ‘reduce harm’ is the relevant moral value that trumps other ethical considerations.
The primacy of a utilitarian approach dictates that those who are in a position to assist the
cessation of the most serious outbreaks in whatever role they may have, must be present to
provide their services, and those who administer health care must also be present to ensure that
all responders are supported and protected to the highest degree.
Public health authorities in many economically advantaged
nations are bracing themselves to face future pandemics that
will harm large numbers of citizens. Modern medical horrors
such as Monkeypox or the much-feared future mutations
of Avian Influenza (H5N1) are mentioned in the same breath
as virulent strains of influenza, as a danger to our ‘way of
living.’ Far beyond sickness and large numbers of death, an
outbreak of one of these pandemics poses a real threat to
long-term health, as well as to the social and economic
well being of significant percentages of our surviving
population.
1
While confronting issues brought forth by a pandemic,
the fundamental nature of ‘public health’ and its focus on
the welfare of a population demands special attention
to utilitarian considerations of promotion of the greatest
goodFin this case, healthFas well as the limitation of
illness and death in the ‘worst-case’ scenarios posed by the
most lethal of pandemics. Of particular interest to this paper
are questions related to the obligation of health-care workers
(HCWs) to report to work in the face of heightened
immunological threat and whether those same workers
should have greater access to immunizations and treatments
than should non-HCWs.
Utilitarianism within public health ethics
The fundamental feature of the ethical theory of utilitarian-
ism states that moral behavior is that which promotes good
and minimizes harm.
2 In writings based on public health,
utilitarianism is widely recognized as a fragment in the
ethical ‘scheme’ of public health,
3 but it is not afforded a
stronger role for two primary reasons: first, considering its
extreme position, utilitarianism is morally problematic,
4 as it
could literally permit anything in the name of the ‘greatest
good to the greatest number,’ and second it is virtually
impossible to live a moral life under the most extreme forms
of utilitarianism, because the obligations are too difficult to
discern (the ‘what’ of promoting the good) and impossible
to execute (the ‘how’).
5
Utilitarianism, in a moderate form, used in public health
ethics, means that our actions and policies should be focused
on increasing the total ‘net’ goodness rather than an average
‘net’ good for each person. The institutions of individual
rights and the recognition of patient autonomy are not
contradictory to this, but are believed to serve the overall
good, as individual benefit increases the total good, and
serves as a preventative measure of unjustified majoritarian
actions against smaller groups.
This model of utilitarianism is evident in many aspects of
public healthFnot only through health-promotion projects
that encourage the otherwise illness-free individuals to take
up a more healthful diet and exercise regimen but also
through harm-reduction programs, in which people with
negative health behaviors such as abuse of drugs or dietary
fats are aided to eliminate, or at least minimize the harm
they cause to those around them.
In everyday practice, the force of this utilitarian aspect
has a supportive role along with other ethical elements of
public health practice, and presents a balanced moral
justification for all actions undertaken in accordance with
this practice.
6 However, I contend that there must be an
‘escalator clause’ in the utilitarian aspect that suggests that
in the event of an extensive threat to the existence of a
population, the force of this utilitarian aspect becomes the
primary consideration in proportion to the threat. Therefore,
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utilitarianism in making public health decisions. This also
entails that the greater the threat, the greater the moral
impetus to minimize the harm to the population.
On duty, outbreaks, and distribution of resources
Obligations to minimize harm and promote the goods of
public health are not particularly controversial in times of
relatively stable ‘good-health’ measures among the populace.
The more troubling question emerges from the scenario
in which promoting health and minimizing illness and
death demands more from HCWsFhow can, or should, we
compel HCWs to attend to their duties in the event that
a highly lethal form of communicable disease should start
spreading?
7
Although current debates focus on questions of duty, and
how much personal risk invalidates that commitment,
utilitarian aspects of that obligation are not given enough
weight in the debate. In many of the debates, the question
of risk is posed in terms of how we do not expect a trained
‘first responder’ to recklessly endanger his or her life to save
the life of another. The classic story of the lifeguard is offered
as exemplar: a lifeguard is not expected to rescue a drowning
swimmer if a shark is clearly present.
8 Although this
statement seems reasonable, it does not justify itself. By
contrast, the consideration of the utilitarian aspect makes
the point that in attempting to save a life, two are likely to be
lost, thus propagating a greater total harm. The same holds
true for the example of firefighters rushing into a house
badly damaged by an active fire. Although there may be a life
on that second floor to save, we do not expect any number of
firefighters to sacrifice their lives for the doomed soul
because the loss of many, including the original life in peril,
is a maximization of harm, when harm should be mini-
mized. When you control for the risks involved, such as
using precautions to assure a level of safety for the rescuers,
such as shark nets for the lifeguard, or safety gear for the
firefighters, then the obligation to assist comes back into full
force, as the potential for greater harm is manageable.
9
It is the variable of risk, which creates variable demands on
those whose duty it is to care for the population in times of
crisis. We consider not only the risk to the obligated but also
a question of the scope of risk to the population. In academic
and public debates regarding the compulsion to attend to
duty in the face of danger, one fallacy has been allowed to
stand: the notion that exposure to a pandemic can be
avoided if one simply does not come to his or her job as a
HCW. Although it is true that working in a hospital during
times of influenza outbreak puts one at a greater risk for
contracting the illness,
10 the more widespread the outbreak,
the more people become sick, and the more likely the ‘stay-
at-home’ HCW will become sick even after having avoided
contact in the course of his or her duties. We could
reasonably state that, by virtue of staying home during a
time of need for his or her service, the HCW improves the
odds that he or she will contract this illness outside
professional practice as part of the greater number who will
be exposed. Another feature of the argument offered to
defend dereliction of duty is to suggest that this risk that the
HCW takes with his or her own health is a fixed variable, and
thus should be considered as an exception to duty. On the
contrary, it is a common feature of the infection-control
literature that states that doctors and nurses are overwhel-
mingly neglectful toward their own basic infection-control
protocols.
11 Therefore, the threat is not a fixed variable, but
one that is actually quite within the scope of the control of a
HCW. Ethically, one cannot willfully or negligently enhance
the exceptions to duty. At the same time, it is an obligation
of the management to ensure that diligent HCWs are
equipped to do all they can to reduce their risks. During
the SARS crisis in Toronto, health-care administrators did
not effectively communicate which precautions should
be undertaken by HCWs to protect themselves.
12 It bears
mentioning that once clear direction could be given about
the type and execution of masking procedures, the intra-
hospital transmission of SARS decreased to 0%.
13 This fact
speaks to the issue of risk, as the non-transmission of SARS
correlated with the increased attentions of management and
staff to infection-control precautions and the provision and
use of proper equipment.
14
When we speak in terms of risk and pandemics from the
utilitarian perspective discussed herein, we recognize that it
is completely nonsensible to sacrifice highly trained HCWs
by rushing them ill equipped into dangerous situations.
Much as with the example of firefighters and the unsafe
burning house, we find it morally unacceptable to treat them
as disposable, because of the singularity of their lives and
their right to exist as individuals. There is also the detriment
we would cause in an event such as a pandemic by losing the
people trained to save us to the very threat they were trained
to save us from. By that same logic, it could be argued that
HCWs should have first access to available and medically
accepted vaccinations by virtue of the fact that those HCWs
are absolutely essential to our survival. The fear of an Avian
Influenza outbreak brought with it much debate about scarce
Tamiflu supplies and giving HCWs preferential access.
15
However, the added value of a HCW is the fact that he or she
will be facing the greater risk by virtue of faithful and
responsible execution of his or her duty, and if this is
trueFand we have seen from the example of SARS that it
is not always the case that HCWs exercise due diligence
or face unmanageable risks of infection simply by being
‘on-site’Fthen we should do more to protect them. Never-
theless, if the claim is that they can excuse themselves from
duty because of risk, then we excuse ourselves from
privileging their protection, through the preferential access
to measures such as Tamiflu. The same should be true for
access to vaccines or treatments: those who are compelled
into service to defend the overall health of a society at
tremendous risk should be first in line, as their opportunity
for infectionFand to act as a vector for infection both
within and outside their health-care facilitiesFmeans that
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prophylaxis. A common objection to this comes from the
perspective of social justice. The objection would point out
that those who are least able to prevent their own infection,
such as those from the lower socioeconomic classes, retirees
and pensioners, and other vulnerable groups, would be
denied access to the protections and treatments that are
going to HCWs whoFto varying degreesFenjoy more
comfortable socioeconomic positions. Although this ques-
tion of access is valid in questions of many public health
interventions, the preference of HCWs in questions of
preferential access to vaccines and treatments is not unjust
in these terms. Fundamentally, justice addresses unjustified
imbalances in treatment. Aristotle famously mandated
that equals should be treated as equals, and unequals as
unequals.
16 The key point of justice is that there should be a
valid justification for differential treatment, and in that
light, in this context, we are describing pandemics that pose
a unique and credible threat to the public in a manner that
could fundamentally undermine our way of life. Preferential
treatment of HCWs, in this limited context, is a just and
defensible practice.
It is this same special status that we afford those who can
save us from the most lethal and dangerous illnesses in times
of public health emergency that also places greater demands
on those same people. The greater the risk to society, the
greater the responsibilities on those who can reduce the
body count. The relationship between the duty of a HCW
and the lethality of a disease is proportionalFdanger and
obligation increase in step with each other, as opposed to
other conceptions that suggest a threshold of exception as
the risk of illness becomes too great. The fundamental flaw
with this suggestion is that a negation of duty in such an
outbreak simply allows the outbreak to pose an even greater
threat to the populationFincluding that same derelict
HCWFrather than confronting the illness in the relatively
controlled environment of a hospital.
Conclusions
Utilitarianism in the form of promoting the good and
diminishing the bad is a key moral belief in the realm of
public health. It is one view in concert with others, all
working to counterbalance each view to achieve a tenable
moral equilibrium. In the extreme cases under consideration
herein, such equilibrium dictates that the moral force of
health promotion and harm minimization increases in
relation to the threat posed to the well being of a larger
society. In the case of widespread death or disability caused
by a pandemic, this paper contended that an increased
threat generates a heightened obligation on the part of
HCWs, while also creating a reasonable expectation that
those same HCWs will have preferential access to vaccines
and treatments.
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